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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The challenges to the constitutionality of several 
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act1 (ACA) should put an end to any question that health 
law is a field.2  In court, the issues were presented as 
                                                          
∗  JD, LLM, MPH; Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, 
Boston University School of Public Health; Professor of Law, Boston 
University School of Law; Professor of Socio-Medical Sciences and 
Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine.  This 
article was first presented as the McDonald-Merrill-Ketcham Memorial 
Award Lecture at Indiana in April 2012.  The author thanks all the 
participants in the anniversary conference for comments and 
suggestions. 
1  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012).  At least 28 cases challenged the individual mandate, the 
expanded eligibility requirements for Medicaid, and/or the use of federal 
funds to subsidize insurance coverage of contraception or abortion in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148, § 
1501, 124 Stat. 119, as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
2  Several scholars have examined the nature of the health law 
field from different perspectives.  See, e.g., George J. Annas, Health 
Law at the Turn of the Century:  From White Dwarf to Red Giant, 21 
CONN. L. REV. 551 (1989); M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health 
Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 247 (2003); Henry T. Greeley, Some Thoughts 
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questions of constitutional law, specifically Congress’s 
power to regulate commerce and to tax and spend for the 
general welfare.3  Nevertheless, analyzing whether those 
powers encompassed the minimum coverage requirement 
(also known as the individual mandate) and the Medicaid 
eligibility expansion necessitated more than passing 
knowledge of health care and health insurance.  
Constitutional scholars suddenly had to be health law 
experts.  The arguments and resulting opinions, however, 
reflect significant gaps in knowledge about health insurance 
and the health care system in general. 
This essay argues that this gap in knowledge matters 
and that it may offer lessons for improving legal education.  
Part 1 considers how ACA litigation arguments framed in 
traditional doctrinal terms missed much of the reality of 
health care.  This suggests that the legal education may 
have failed to prepare advocates on both sides to identify 
and explain relevant arguments.  Thus, Part 2 summarizes 
several relevant critiques of legal education.  Part 3 then 
considers aspects of health law that offer promising 
responses to some of these critiques.  Part 4 offers ideas for 
a broader vision for educating scholars and lawyers in 
health law.  Most important, the legal profession, like the 
medical profession, faces a system in which services are 
increasingly costly and concentrated among those with the 
greatest resources.  The history of health reform itself may 
                                                                                                                                      
on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391 (2006); Mark A. 
Hall, The History and Future of Health Law:  An Essentialist View, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347 (2006); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages 
of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004); S. Sandy Sandbar et al., 
Legal Medicine and Health Law Education, in LEGAL MEDICINE 3 (S. 
Sandy Sandbar et al. eds., 7th ed. 2007); Walter Wadlington, Some 
Reflections on Teaching Law and Medicine in Law School Since the ‘60s, 
14 HEALTH MATRIX 231 (2004); Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an 
Architecture of Health Law, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 67 (2009). 
3  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (“Congress shall have Power 
To lay and collect Taxes . . . provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States; . . . To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
tribes.”). 
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hold lessons for the legal system and how to prepare 
lawyers to provide affordable services to all those in need. 
II. THE ACA CHALLENGE WAS NOT AN EASY CASE 
 
When the ACA was first challenged, some constitutional 
scholars believed it would be an easy case.4  That 
assumption was belied by the fact that both ACA opponents 
and supporters believed it was an easy case.  Nothing as 
path breaking as the ACA, the most significant national 
legislation in the health care field since the 1965 enactment 
of Medicare and Medicaid, was likely to be easy.  
Nonetheless, to many, the constitutional questions seemed 
straightforward when viewed from a traditional scholarly 
point of view.  But, there were at least two points of view, 
based in large part on conceptions of federal power, and 
neither was adequate to argue or predict the outcome.  
Neither side fully understood how “commerce” and 
“spending” functioned in the health care system, so their 
arguments remained largely abstract and detached from the 
facts.  To varying degrees, the Justices reflected a similar 
detachment in their opinions in the case. 
By now, the arguments are well known and will not be 
repeated here.  Suffice it to say that the arguments over the 
minimum coverage requirement parsed cases on Congress’s 
Article I powers to tax and spend and to regulate 
commerce.5  The briefs, oral arguments, published articles, 
and the decision itself repeatedly analyzed Supreme Court 
decisions like Wickard,6 Lopez,7 Raich,8 and Comstock.9  
                                                          
4  See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., A Healthy Debate:  The 
Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 93 (2009). 
5  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why 
the Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIBERTY 581 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to 
Health Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, 
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
6  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
7  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
8  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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None of these cases offered an exact precedent for the 
minimum coverage requirement.  Congress had never 
imposed a precisely comparable requirement on individuals 
before.10  This alone made it a difficult case. 
Of course, the fact that a law is novel does not make it 
unconstitutional.11  During the Great Depression, the Social 
Security Act was vigorously challenged as an unprecedented 
expansion of federal government authority to tax and spend 
– a point that Justice Ginsburg tried to make in the ACA 
oral argument.12  In 1937, the Social Security Act 
challengers argued that Congress’s power to tax and spend 
for the general welfare did not include the power to pay old-
age pensions only to the elderly.  In Helvering v. Davis, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Social 
Security tax on employees to provide pensions to the 
elderly,13 but the outcome was not a foregone conclusion.  
Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented on the grounds 
that the Act was “repugnant to the Tenth Amendment,” 14 
just as the ACA challengers argued that the individual 
mandate invades state sovereignty. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo apparently felt 
compelled to explain the national need for federal financial 
aid.  He did so in language that could apply to health 
insurance today: 
                                                                                                                                      
9  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
10  See Wendy K. Mariner, Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, 
Reframing Federalism—The Affordable Care Act (and Broccoli) in the 
Supreme Court, 367 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 12 (2012).  
11  But see Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2586  (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) 
(“But sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional 
problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress's action.”). 
12  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Dep’t of Health and 
Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-
398-Tuesday.pdf.  
13  See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the 
Social Security Act income tax on employees); see also Steward Mach. 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act excise 
tax on employers).  
14  Helvering, 301 U.S. at 646 (Reynolds, J. and Butler, J., 
dissenting). 
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Needs that were narrow or parochial a century 
ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-
being of the nation.  What is critical or urgent 
change with the times. 
 
The purge of nation-wide calamity that began in 
1929 has taught us many lessons. . . . Spreading 
from state to state, unemployment is an ill not 
particular but general, which may be checked, if 
Congress so determines, by the resources of the 
nation. . . . But the ill is all one . . . whether men 
are thrown out of work because there is no 
longer work to do or because the disabilities of 
age make them incapable of doing it.  Rescue 
becomes necessary irrespective of the cause.  
The hope behind this statute is to save men and 
women from the rigors of the poor house . . . .15 
This kind of contextual explanation was largely missing 
from the ACA litigation.16  Without it, however, 
                                                          
15  Id. at 641. 
16  An exception was Solicitor General Donald Verrilli’s last minute 
plea at end of the last day of oral argument:  
 
There is an important connection, a profound 
connection between that problem and liberty.  And I do 
think it’s important that we not lose sight of that . . . 
[because of the Medicaid expansion] there will be 
millions of people with chronic conditions like diabetes 
and heart disease, and as a result of the health care they 
will get, they will be unshackled from the disabilities 
that those diseases put on them and have the 
opportunity to enjoy the blessings of liberty.  And the 
same will be true for – for a husband whose wife is 
diagnosed with breast cancer and who won’t face the 
prospect of being forced into bankruptcy to try to get 
care for his wife and face the risk of having to raise his 
children alone, and I could multiply example after 
example after example.  
 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 79-80, Dep’t of Health and Human 
Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400), available at http:// 
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constitutional doctrine was not sufficient to resolve a matter 
of first impression either way.17  The Court’s majority and 
dissenting opinions found little precedent to support their 
conclusions, despite occasionally tortured efforts to identify 
analogies and distinctions in earlier cases.  But this should 
not mean that novel cases can be decided on the basis of the 
Justices’ outcome preferences.  Where doctrine alone cannot 
control, it becomes necessary to understand what the law at 
issue actually does, so that doctrine can be refined in 
principled ways.  The novelty of the ACA meant applying 
doctrine – which itself was less than crystal clear – to 
complex issues of health care and health insurance 
financing.  Resolving the constitutional question depended 
on knowledge of the health care system, insurance, and how 
insurance is used to pay for health care.  Few, if any, 
constitutional scholars or practitioners had that 
knowledge.18 
Counsel for the challengers framed the Commerce 
Clause claim most simply:  that a requirement to obtain 
health coverage was simply a mandate to buy a commercial 
                                                                                                                                      
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-400. 
pdf. 
17  See Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz, 
Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli? And Why That’s a Hard 
Question, 364 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 201 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Commerce 
Clause Challenges to Health Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825 (2011). 
18  Few people – lawyers and judges included – understand health 
insurance.  And few of those who understand insurance in general 
understand health insurance, which functions quite differently from 
traditional indemnity insurance for things like cars and houses.  See 
generally Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform:  What’s Insurance Got to 
Do with It? Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of 
Insurance, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 436 (2010).  Some economists with 
expertise in the health care industry readily understood the rationale 
for requiring almost everyone to participate in an insurance pool, and 
many supported the minimum coverage requirement.  See Brief for 
Economic Scholars in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on the 
Minimum Coverage Issue at 2-5, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. v. 
Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/11-398.html; JONATHAN 
GRUBER, HEALTH CARE REFORM:  WHAT IT IS, WHY IT’S NECESSARY, 
HOW IT WORKS (2011).  But they were not in a position to present a 
doctrinal argument. 
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product, which amounted to requiring people to engage in 
commerce, not regulating any existing commerce.19  Of 
course, the ACA permits the coverage requirement to be 
satisfied by government-funded health benefit programs, 
such as Medicare, Medicaid, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as 
employee group health plans.20  Nevertheless, Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito 
accepted the characterization of health insurance as a 
commercial product.21  Thus, if Congress could require 
individuals to buy this commercial product, then surely it 
could require individuals to buy other products.22  In light of 
                                                          
19  See Brief for State Respondents on the Minimum Coverage 
Provision at 15, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/preview_home/11-398.html. 
20  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2010); Paul Fronstin, Sources of 
Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:  Analysis of the 
March 2012 Current Population Survey, EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. 
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 376, Sept. 2012, at 4, available at 
http://www.ebri.com/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=51
14 (noting that 18% of the nonelderly population was not covered by 
health insurance in 2011). 
21  See generally Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566.  The Chief Justice and 
the Justices in the Joint Dissent described health insurance only as a 
commercial product, and then only in terms of traditional non-group 
indemnity insurance, which is underwritten so that it is actuarially fair:  
you only pay for your own personal risks.  However, all but a small 
proportion of health insurance in the United States is either public 
benefit programs or private employee group insurance, which is not 
underwritten.  See Fronstin, supra note 20, at 5 fig. 1; Paul Fronstin, 
Employment-Based Health Benefits:  Trends in Access and Coverage, 
1997-2010, EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 370, Apr. 
2012, available at http://www.ebri.com/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa= 
ibDisp&content_id=5042.  Only about 7 percent of the nonelderly U.S. 
population is covered by underwritten, individual (non-group) health 
insurance policies.  Fronstin, supra note 20, at 5, fig. 1. 
22  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (“The mandate primarily affects 
healthy, often young adults who are less likely to need significant health 
care and have other priorities for spending their money.”), at 2642 
(Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting).  In fact, the 
major reason that people are uninsured is that they cannot afford the 
cost of insurance.  SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR THE U.S. 
POPULATION:  NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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the breadth of commerce in today’s national and global 
markets, such an expansive power looks more like the 
states’ police power than a specific, enumerated federal 
power.  These five Justices expressly sought to preserve the 
distinction between federal and state sovereignty.23  Their 
solution was to draw a bright line between those who are 
and are not active or engaged in interstate commerce, with 
federal authority to regulate commerce limited to the 
former.24  Although the Justices did not constrict the scope 
of Congress’s commerce power, the majority would not 
expand it to include the power to require individuals to do 
something.25 
Applying the active/inactive in commerce rule may not 
be as easy as the Justices seemed to assume.  As Judge 
Sutton noted in his concurring opinion upholding the 
individual mandate for the sixth circuit Court of Appeals 
below, many instances of doing nothing can be 
characterized as doing something else and vice versa.26  The 
absence of any analysis of how the boundaries may blur 
deprives the majority’s commerce clause opinions of some 
measure of persuasiveness.27 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor 
and Kagan, dissented from the majority’s commerce clause 
conclusions. Her opinion demonstrated a better 
understanding of the health care system.  It viewed health 
insurance not as a fungible commercial product, but as a 
necessary means of paying for health care.28  Since virtually 
                                                                                                                                      
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 71 table 25 (2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_248.pdf. 
23  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2575, 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., 
Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting). 
24  Id. at 2591. 
25  Id.  
26  Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 560-63 (6th Cir. 
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring), cert. denied, (2012) (abrogated by 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566). 
27  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“[I]f history 
is any guide, today’s construction of the Commerce Clause will not 
endure.”). 
28  Id. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J.). 
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everyone uses health care, they are already engaged in 
commerce, so the coverage requirement simply regulated 
how and when they pay for care.29  This, she argued, would 
not open the door to federal requirements that individuals 
buy cars or vegetables, because other products do not share 
health insurance’s characteristics.30  This was a more 
complex argument to make, one requiring knowledge of the 
health care system.   
The majority and minority Justices appeared to view the 
case through the lens of federalism.  What was needed to 
convince a majority of the Justices to uphold the ACA’s 
federal mandate under the Commerce Clause was a 
principled distinction between a requirement for health 
insurance coverage and a requirement to buy anything else 
– one that also served to distinguish the Commerce power 
from the police power.31  Such a distinction depended on 
facts specific to the health care system that would not apply 
to the purchase of all products.32  In short, to win the 
commerce clause argument, the government needed a 
limiting principle, and neither the government nor any 
Justice was able to articulate a sufficiently convincing one.33  
                                                          
29  Id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J.) (“Persons subject to the mandate must 
now pay for medical care in advance (instead of at the point of service) 
and through insurance (instead of out of pocket).”). 
30  Id. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J.) (“One could call this concern the 
‘broccoli horrible,’” referring to the Chief Justice’s mention of a mandate 
to buy green vegetables). 
31  Id. at 2591, 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
32  The Brief of 104 Health Law Professors as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at page three, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. v. 
Fla., 132 S. Ct 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/
briefs/11-398_petitioneramcu104healthlawprofs.authcheckdam.pdf 
(offering a factual description) was submitted to provide the Court with 
those facts.  Together with Mark A. Hall, the author helped draft the 
Brief, organized health law professors’ participation, engaged counsel, 
and signed the Brief. 
33  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., 
Alito, J., dissenting).  Paul Clement, representing the state challengers, 
argued that the federal government had no limiting principle for 
Congress’s power to require individuals to buy commercial products, 
10 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:1 
 
Instead, both the parties and the Justices argued the case in 
terms of abstract principles of federalism and barely looked 
beyond their own preferred interpretations of the Commerce 
power. 
A better understanding of health insurance itself might 
have compelled the Justices to think more deeply about 
what was being regulated.  In the absence of cogent 
explanations, the Court was left with an inadequate factual 
basis for determining whether the commerce power could 
apply to the minimum coverage requirement without 
implying that Congress could force people to enter markets 
involuntarily.34  Thus, the Justices’ opinions tracked their 
                                                                                                                                      
and began his oral argument by stating that the individual mandate is 
“an unprecedented effort by Congress to compel individuals to enter 
commerce.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Dep’t of Health and 
Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).  See Mariner, 
supra note 17, at 201-201 (noting the need for a persuasive limiting 
principle). This is not the first time that constitutional law scholars 
have misjudged the Supreme Court in health law cases.  Professor 
Laurence Tribe argued on behalf of patients for the right to have 
physicians assist their suicides.  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).  At 
the time, colleagues suggested that it should be an easy win:  the 
Supreme Court would find a constitutional right to physician-assisted 
suicide and strike down laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide, 
perhaps relying on Justice Kennedy’s “mystery of human life” language 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992).  But, the Court did not do so.  Its decision made clear that the 
Court wanted a limiting principle on the purported right to assisted 
suicide, which the litigants did not provide.  Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 733 (1997). 
34  The majority’s decision on the Medicaid eligibility expansion 
also demonstrated incomplete knowledge of the structure and history of 
Medicaid, but the decisive factor appeared to be preserving state 
jurisdiction over the state’s laws implementing Medicaid programs.  
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601-8.  The Chief Justice’s opinion relied for the 
first time on the concept of coercion to find that the spending power 
precluded the federal government from ending all federal Medicaid 
funding of states that declined to adopt the newest category of eligible 
beneficiaries (adults under 65 years of age with incomes less than 133% 
of the federal poverty level) added by the ACA.  Id. at 2606-7; 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396c (2012). 
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views of the boundary between federal and state 
jurisdiction.35 
The idea that the parties failed to appreciate relevant 
facts about the structure and financing of the health care 
system is significant, but not because a factual analysis 
should displace doctrinal analysis.  Rather, doctrine 
requires interpretation when it is applied to new subject 
matter, and meaningful application of doctrine requires an 
accurate understanding of the subject matter.  If the subject 
matter is misunderstood, the doctrine may be interpreted in 
incongruous ways, which may distort doctrine in its 
applications in other contexts.36 Regardless of whether such 
an analysis would have upheld the individual mandate, it 
should have produced a more robust and persuasive 
refinement of the definition of commerce. 
III. DOES LEGAL EDUCATION CONTRIBUTE TO INEFFECTUAL 
SCHOLARSHIP OR PRACTICE? 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the public and 
courtroom debate over the constitutionality of the individual 
                                                          
35  This is not to say that the Justices are motivated by public 
opinion or politics, which are not the same as ideology.  See Lawrence 
Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not 
the American People, 98 GEO. L. J. 1515 (2010) (arguing that the 
Justices probably care more about the opinions of elites than the public). 
36  For example, in his opinion on the Medicaid expansion, the 
Chief Justice called the addition of the new eligibility category “a shift 
in kind, not merely degree.”  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 1575.  Yet, the 
opinion does not identify any relevant factual distinction between the 
eligibility categories originally in effect and added by pre-2010 
amendments and the category added by the ACA.  See generally Sara 
Rosenbaum & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, All Heat, No Light – The States’ 
Medicaid Claims before the Supreme Court, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 487 
(2012).  Without a clear distinction, the decision invites confusion and 
future litigation over whether statutory amendments qualify as 
amendments or create entirely new programs.  The Joint Dissent’s 
characterization of generous federal funding as “coercive” is similarly 
unclear.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, 
J., and Alito, J., dissenting).  See  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); S.D. v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203 (1987). 
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mandate:  (1) health law issues pervade modern society; and 
(2) well trained lawyers failed to adequately explain or 
justify their positions on the constitutionality of the ACA.  
Both conclusions suggest that legal education may be 
missing an opportunity to prepare both scholars and 
practicing lawyers for effective careers today.  Several 
critiques of legal education offer clues to what might 
contribute to this missed opportunity. 
The critiques of interest here are a highly selective 
sample.37  I will not address the challenges that universities 
themselves face, which include increasing competition for 
students in a difficult economic environment with rising 
costs, income inequality, and high student loan debt,38 
                                                          
37  For comprehensive overviews, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or 
Retrenchment:  Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735 
(2011).  Well known studies of legal education include WILLIAM M. 
SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND & LEE 
S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (The Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of 
Teaching ed. 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; AM. BAR ASS’N, 
SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR & TASK 
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:  NARROWING THE GAP, 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT – AN EDUCATION 
CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; AM. BAR ASS’N, 
SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY:  
THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979) [hereinafter CRAMPTON REPORT].  
38  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES - HIGHER EDUCATION:  ISSUES RELATED TO 
LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1020.pdf.  The Project on Student Debt 
at the Institute for College Access & Success estimated that “two-thirds 
of college seniors who graduated in 2010 had student loan debt, with an 
average of $25,250.”  Student Debt and the Class of 2010, THE 
INSTITUTE FOR COLLEGE ACCESS & SUCCESS (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://ticas.org/files/pub/classof2010.pdf.  See The Student Loan “Debt 
Bomb”:  America’s Next Mortgage-Style Economic Crisis?:  A Report 
Prepared for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Attorneys (NACBA), NACBA (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://nacba.org/Portals/0/Documents/Student%20Loan%20Debt/020712
%20NACBA%20student%20loan%20debt%20report.pdf (reporting that 
“Americans now owe more on student loans than on credit cards.”).  The 
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technological advances, and pressure to disclose graduate 
employment data,39 reduce tuition, augment endowments, 
and demonstrate the value-added of a university 
education.40  Most law schools sit within universities, and 
their fate is tied to a significant degree with the fate of their 
university.41  But law schools face their own unique 
challenges.  Perhaps the most pressure to conform to a 
traditional model of legal education comes from the 
rankings, whose criteria drive law schools’ activities and 
metrics.42  But these are so well known, and almost 
                                                                                                                                      
total amount of outstanding student loans exceeded $1 trillion in 2011.  
Id. at 1.   
39  The American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar, the accrediting body for U.S. law schools, 
adopted a requirement in June 2012, approved by the ABA House of 
Delegates in August 2012, that law schools disclose data on graduates’ 
employment, student attrition, and scholarships conditioned on 
minimum grades.  Debra Cassens Weiss, No Fudging:  Revised 
Standard Bars Law Schools from Publishing Misleading Consumer Info, 
ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/no_fudging_revised_standard_b
ars_law_schools_from_publishing_misleadin (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).  
40  In an address at the University of Michigan in January 2012, 
President Obama said: 
“So, from now on, I’m telling Congress we should steer federal 
campus-based aid to those colleges that keep tuition affordable, provide 
good value, serve their students well.  We are putting colleges on notice . 
. . .  If you can’t stop tuition from going up, then the funding you get 
from taxpayers each year will go down.”  Obama in Ann Arbor: Text of 
the President’s Speech on Affordability, ANNARBOR.COM (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www.annarbor.com/news/obama-in-ann-arbor-text-of-the-
presidents-speech-on-college-affordability/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).  
41  Gene R. Nichol, Rankings, Economic Challenge, and the Future 
of Legal Education, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 345 (2012). 
42  See TAMANAHA, supra note 37, at 78-99; Michael Sauder & 
Wendy Espeland, Fear of Falling:  The Effect of U.S. News & World 
Report Rankings on U.S. Law Schools — Grant Report 07-02, in L. SCH. 
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL REPORT SERIES 9-15  (2007), available at 
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/research/gr/gr-07-02.asp; Deborah L. 
Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 
IND. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000).  
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universally lamented, that there is no need to mention them 
further.43 
The best-known criticisms of legal education are what I 
call the Ivory Tower Critiques.  These argue that legal 
education (1) is overly abstract and distant from real world 
problems, with too much emphasis on theory, (2) offers 
limited attention to practice issues, in particular, what 
lawyers do interacting with clients, prosecutors, businesses, 
administrative agencies, and other lawyers, and (3) 
produces scholarship of limited relevance to practitioners or 
judges.44 
Legal education has been criticized for its distance from 
practice for decades, notably by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome 
Frank.45  A notorious example of the ivory tower critique is 
Justice Roberts’ comment at a 4th Circuit Judicial 
Conference in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in 
June 2011.  He reportedly said: 
 
                                                          
43  This essay also does not address styles of teaching or student 
learning, student stress, exams and methods of assessment, law school 
accreditation, or false advertising about law jobs after graduation, 
which has been much in the news recently.  See, e.g., Rogelio A. Lasso, 
Is Our Students Learning? Using Assessments to Measure and Improve 
Law School Learning and Performance, 15 BARRY L. REV. 73 (2010); G. 
Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing 
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 11 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 225 (1986); Ann L. Iijima, Lessons Learned: Legal 
Education and Law Student Dysfunction, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524 
(1998); David Segal, For Law Schools, a Price to Play the A.B.A.’s Way, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/ 
business/for-law-schools-a-price-to-play-the-abas-way.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0. 
44  See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); 
Stewart Macauly, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II:  
Some Notes on Two Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 506 (1982); CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 95-97; 
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37; CRAMPTON REPORT, supra note 37, at 
3-4, 15-18. 
45  See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:  
SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); Jerome Frank, Why 
Not a Clinical Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). 
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Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, 
and the first article is likely to be, you know, 
the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary 
approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or 
something, which I’m sure was of great 
interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t 
of much help to the bar.46 
Perhaps this is why judges rarely read law review 
articles.  Few law school professors would dispute the claim 
that their legal research, at least before tenure review, 
focuses on developing novel theories of law, which are read 
almost exclusively by other law professors.47 
The grain of truth in the ivory tower critique – one that 
is relevant to the ACA litigation – is that the focus on 
theory may blind lawyers to the need for more specific and 
intensive examination of the subject matter to which theory 
and doctrine may apply.  However, this does not mean that 
law schools ought to abandon rigorous teaching about 
theory and doctrine.48  Such teaching is foundational – 
necessary, but not sufficient.  Rather, the critique raises the 
perennial question of whether law schools should be 
training practitioners, as in the historical trade school 
model, or educating research scholars, as in the traditional 
Ph.D model.49 
                                                          
46  Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on 
Academic Scholarship, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y BLOG (July 5, 2011), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justice-
roberts%E2%80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship (last visited Nov. 8, 
2012).  
47  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 
885 (2009). 
48  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal 
Training and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993); George L. 
Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial 
Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas:  A Reply to Judge Edwards, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1993); Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major 
American Law School, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2167 (1993). 
49  See William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of 
Professional Legal Training and a Proposal for Its Revitalization in 
Professional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 201 (1996). 
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Law schools and lawyers have struggled with the 
question of which model suits legal education since the Civil 
War era.50  Nineteenth century German and other 
European university systems, which had established 
faculties in theology, philosophy, medicine, and law, 
apparently impressed several influential academics.51  The 
European conception of law as a science that required 
formal study distinguished the legal profession from a mere 
guild for craftsmen.52  It helped to characterize law as an 
academic discipline, instead of a trade, and worthy of 
placement within a university at a time when universities 
were becoming research institutions.  It also offered an 
opportunity to develop an elite class of law professors 
capable of teaching the science – full-time academics who 
gradually replaced practicing lawyers as teachers.53  These 
attractions elevated research and scholarship over 
occupational training as the benchmark for academic 
standing.  The development of formal legal education 
supplanted apprenticeship with practicing lawyers and 
culminated in today’s model of a three-year program of 
graduate studies following a university undergraduate 
degree.54 
                                                          
50  ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850’S TO THE 1980’S 24, 51, 135, 265 (1983). See 
generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:  
THE LAW MAKERS (1950). 
51  See Gail J. Hupper, The Rise of an Academic Doctorate in Law:  
Origins Through World War II, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 8-9 (2007) 
(noting the Presidents of Harvard, Cornell and Chicago as examples).  
For an example of this influence, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Use 
and Meaning of Law Schools, and Their Methods of Instruction, 20 AM. 
L. REV. 919 (1886). 
52  STEVENS, supra note 50, at 52-53; James E. Herget, The 
Influence of German Thought on American Jurisprudence, 1880-1918, 
in THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW 
WORLD 1820-1920 203, 215 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).   
53  Mathias Reimann, A Career in Itself—The German 
Professoriate as a Model for American Legal Academia, in THE 
RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 
1820-1920 165, 188 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993). 
54  STEVENS, supra note 50, at 205, 209. 
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Law professors have been expected to write scholarly 
articles, perhaps since then Dean of Harvard Law School 
urged it as one of three essential elements of the faculty in 
1901.55  Yet, the quality of law faculty scholarship is highly 
variable.  Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ critique, there are 
thoughtful, relevant and useful law review articles (many of 
them in health law).56  However, the more practical and 
relevant they are, the less likely they are to provide support 
for tenure.  If we are honest, we must concede that the 
pressure to be original in theory or, to a lesser extent, 
doctrine can produce irrelevant – sometimes ridiculous – 
scholarship that would never be accepted in any other field 
of research.57  Furthermore, there is almost no supervision 
                                                          
55  James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in 
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 
364 (1913) (noting that the other elements are teaching, id. at 362, and 
influencing legislation and the development of the law, id. at 367).  
56  See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, New York Times Financial Advice:  
Be an Unpaid Intern Through Your 20s (The Work till You’re 100), 
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 20, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/11/new-
york-times-financial-advice-be.html (noting Nicolas Terry’s “cutting 
edge work on digital medical records”); Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong 
with Health Privacy? 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1 (2009); Sidney D. 
Watson, The Road from Massachusetts to Missouri: Can Other States 
Replicate Massachusetts’ Health Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1331 (2007). 
57  See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  
Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (“The fact that suicide is currently illegal 
marks a classic form of heavy-handed paternalism . . . .  An alternative 
policy . . . is to sanction suicide, but only after a mandatory cooling-off 
period.  Such a policy might, for example, require a suicidal person to 
‘give notice’ of the desire to commit suicide one month in advance with 
the ability to rescind the notice at any point during the intervening 
period.”).  The authors were apparently not aware that suicide was (and 
is) not illegal, so their factual premise was in error.  Instead, they made 
an interesting theoretical argument for replacing the non-existent crime 
with an impractical alternative, since a majority of suicide attempts are 
spur of the moment decisions, which are not likely to be affected by any 
notice requirement.  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REDUCING SUICIDE:  A 
NATIONAL IMPERATIVE (S.K. Goldsmith et al. eds., 2002); Keith 
Hawton, Christopher Ware, Hamant Mistry, et al., Why Patients 
Choose Paracetamol for Self-Poisoning and Their Knowledge of Its 
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of the accuracy of legal research.58  Student journal editors 
are well trained in paragraph structure and reference 
formatting, but are rarely familiar with the subject matter 
of the article they “edit.”  Few law journals use peer review 
to vet articles submitted for publication, so external experts 
have no opportunity to evaluate the premises, methods or 
conclusions of papers before publication.  Moreover, few 
experts who are able to notice errors even read the journals.  
Law students typically rely on law review articles for their 
own research, so that errors embedded in journals are often 
perpetuated rather than corrected over time. 
Law schools do some things well.  The very first 
observation of the Carnegie Report was: 
 
Within months of their arrival in law school, 
students demonstrate new capacities for 
understanding legal processes, for seeing both 
sides of legal arguments, for sifting through 
facts and precedents in search of the more 
plausible account, for using precise language, 
and for understanding the applications and 
conflicts of legal rules. Despite a wide variety 
of social backgrounds and undergraduate 
experiences, they are learning, in the parlance 
of legal education, to ‘think like a lawyer.’59 
Learning how to think like a lawyer is especially 
valuable for issue-spotting, but it has a downside.  One 
                                                                                                                                      
Dangers, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 164.1 (1995), available at http://www 
.bmj.com/content/310/6973/164.1. 
58  There is some irony in the fact that legal scholarship was 
intended to resemble that of research for Ph.D.s in university 
departments, partly to justify legal studies as graduate level academic 
work, but did not adopt the same oversight and peer review 
requirements.  See STEVENS, supra note 50. 
59  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, 
LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION 
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW, SUMMARY 5 (The Carnegie Found. for 
the Advancement of Teaching ed. 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE 
SUMMARY].  Critiques of the Carnegie Report soon proliferated.  See, 
e.g., Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353 
(2012).  
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disadvantage arises from the use of casebooks, which 
publish highly edited versions of reported appellate cases — 
stripped of factual details — to demonstrate legal 
principles.  The Carnegie Report observes that: 
 
most law schools emphasize the priority of 
analytic thinking, in which students learn to 
categorize and discuss persons and events in 
highly generalized terms.  This emphasis on 
analysis and system has profound effects in 
shaping a legal frame of mind.  At a deep, 
largely uncritical level, the students come to 
understand the law as a formal and rational 
system, however much its doctrines and rules 
may diverge from the common sense 
understandings of the lay person.60 
The idea that law is a science – a set of (ideally neutral) 
principles that can be discerned with the appropriate 
analytic and conceptual skills – remains embedded in the 
core justification for legal education.61  US law schools 
narrowed the scope of the original European idea of law as 
science. Nineteenth century European curricula included 
history, economics, political theory, sociology, Roman law, 
and comparative law as part of the study of law.  US law 
schools dropped those subjects for decades and only slowly 
reintroduced them in somewhat different forms, typically 
under specialized rubrics like law and economics and law 
and society.62  To be sure, critiques from successive 
movements – legal realism, positivism, critical legal theory, 
feminist theory, and social theory – have substantially 
                                                          
60  CARNEGIE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at 5. 
61  See generally STEVENS, supra note 50; Herget, supra note 52. 
62  STEVENS, supra note 50, at 277.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010); Sabine Frerichs, Studying 
Law, Economy and Society:  A Short History of Socio-Legal Thinking, 
(U. Helsinki Research Paper Series, Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No. 19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022891; 
MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); 
ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976). 
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weakened law’s claim to universality and neutrality.63  But 
the core claim is hard to give up.  If law is simply the result 
of power struggles, what science remains for law schools to 
teach?  Our students might be better off in departments of 
political science, economics, or sociology.64 
The solution cannot be to ignore theory or return to the 
days of apprenticeship training. However, insistence on 
developing novel and arcane theories divorced from the 
factors that influence law is driving scholarship farther 
away from making a meaningful contribution to 
jurisprudence.65  The future of law schools may depend on a 
revolutionary rethinking of their structure and curriculum.  
Of course, law schools have not ignored these challenges.  
Nonetheless, a multitude of obstacles has stymied 
meaningful change.  Most valuable reforms implemented so 
far, such as clinical seminars and externships, tend to be 
additions to a crowded curriculum.66  Moreover, they are 
often taught by clinical faculty, who complain of second 
class citizenship, often quite rightly.67  The real problem is 
that patching in new courses does little to change the 
perspective of legal education. 
                                                          
63  See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE 
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY:  A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 
(2004); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); 
Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1017 
(1981); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical 
Social Science:  From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 
(1979). 
64  See generally David Van Zandt et al., The Case Against Law 
School, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfor 
debate/2011/07/21/the-case-against-law-school?hp (discussing the need 
for law schools and their structure).  
65  See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know:  Lawyering Expertise, 
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 
(1995). 
66  See Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, 
Clinical Education for this Millennium:  The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 1 (2000). 
67  See Elliott S. Milstein, Clinical Legal Education in the United 
States:  In-House Clinics, Externships, and Simulations, 51 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 375 (2001) (describing the range of programs). 
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This brings me to a different set of criticisms of legal 
education, which I call the Social Justice Critique.  This 
critique argues that many programmatic elements of the 
curriculum narrow the scope of legal analysis to one that 
preserves the status quo, perpetuates powerful elites68 and 
stifles creative thinking about the law and solutions to legal 
problems.  Of particular concern is the categorization of 
required and elective courses.  To social critics, the 
foundational courses of contracts, torts, civil procedure, and 
property immediately establish an image of law as 
primarily private case law.  This private law emphasis 
reinforces the idea that corporate and property issues are 
the core of law, because they are the focus of learning how 
to think like lawyers.  Directly or indirectly, it can train 
students to accept the existing structure of public and 
private institutions and financial relationships as 
normative and neutral in their effects, and thus to 
perpetuate the status quo.69 
Courses in legislation, administrative law, employment 
law, anti-discrimination law, and the like are typically 
relegated to elective status, creating the impression such 
subjects are peripheral in value.  This can create a distorted 
picture of the legal landscape, especially since so much legal 
practice involves the drafting, interpretation, and 
application of legislation and regulations. 
While the case method has substantial value in learning 
to think like a lawyer, the use of edited casebooks 
                                                          
68  Joan Williams notes that “one role of law school has been to 
train members of the elite to assume elite positions,” and “Langdell 
invented his curriculum at Harvard to boss around other members of 
the elite,” but adds that it now also serves as a pathway for non-elites to 
enter the elite class.  Bob Gordon, Jack Schlegel, James May & Joan 
Williams, Colloquium:  Legal Education Then and Now:  Changing 
Patterns in Legal Training and in the Relationship of Law Schools to 
the World Around Them, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 769 (1998). 
69  The expense of a legal education and the concentration of 
employment in corporate-oriented practice may exacerbate this effect, 
making access to justice unaffordable for low and middle-income 
Americans.  See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial Abdication and Equal 
Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325 (2010); 
Rhode, supra note 42, at 23. 
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sometimes undermines creative thinking.70  Some casebooks 
drain the life out of legal problems.  Few contain facts to 
illuminate the context of legal problems.  The discussion of 
cases leads students to focus on the legal issue, separate 
and apart from the social context. Problems are abstracted 
from their human dimension and considered only with 
respect to whether they fall within a rule.71  The Supreme 
Court’s oral arguments exemplified a similar “bloodless” 
debate.  It teaches that the ethical and social consequences 
of justifiable principles are beyond the scope of relevant 
consideration. 
The absence of context – how and why legal problems 
arise in a particular society – gives students little 
opportunity for thinking about how to make strategic 
choices.72  Without practice at attention to context, law 
graduates may not recognize the complexity of their clients’ 
problems.73  In light of the dynamic nature of many legal 
rules, and especially regulations, there is significant need 
for thinking carefully not only about what legal remedies 
are available, but also why only these and not others exist, 
and whether others could be developed.  In this way, context 
can nurture useful new theories in law. 
The Carnegie Report also notes that law schools pay less 
attention to the civic, professional, ethical and leadership 
roles of lawyers.74  Thus, graduates may miss important 
opportunities to exercise leadership to improve social 
                                                          
70  See generally Todd D. Rakoff & Martha L. Minow, A Case for 
Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597 (2007) (critiquing the case 
method); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix:  
Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2007) (critiquing the case method); Laura 
Kalman, To Hell with Langdell, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771 (1995) 
(critiquing the case method). 
71  See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 187. 
72  See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST:  
LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001). 
73  See Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 353 (2012). 
74  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 6.  See also Angela P. 
Harris & Marjorie Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”:  Toward 
Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773 (1993). 
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institutions.75  Furthermore, a tight focus on legal doctrine 
can breed hammer-and-nail problems:  when your only tool 
is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. If law is your 
tool, you may tend to view law as the sole cause of – and 
therefore the only solution to – a problem.76  Sometimes, 
law is not the answer.  Lawyers who fail to recognize 
complex sources of problems causes can miss the most 
effective solutions. 
IV. HEALTH LAW OFFERS A MODEL FOR RETHINKING LEGAL 
EDUCATION, AT LEAST IN PART 
 
The health law field suffers less from these criticisms 
than do most other legal fields and has several advantages 
that could be translated to other areas in the law 
curriculum.  A particular advantage of health law in 
responding to critiques of legal education is that, as an 
applied area, it cannot avoid attention to real world 
problems.  Moreover, these problems range across social and 
economic life from birth to death, exposing students to a 
wide array of both doctrinal and practical issues.77  After 
                                                          
75  See Karen H. Rothenberg, Recalibrating the Moral Compass:  
Expanding “Thinking Like a Lawyer” into “Thinking Like a Leader”, 40 
U. TOL. L. REV. 411 (2009). 
76  For example, liability for injury is often cited as a major cause of 
problems like the high cost of some pharmaceuticals, the limited 
development of new vaccines, the price of medical malpractice 
premiums, and insufficient volunteers in emergencies, without 
examining other reasons, such as low return on investment, lack of 
market demand or resources, or better alternatives.  See generally 
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Improving Antibiotic Markets 
for Long Term Sustainability, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
101 (2011); Charles H. Schultz & George J. Annas, Altering the 
Standard of Care — Unnecessary and Dangerous, 59 ANNALS 
EMERGENCY MED. 191 (2011); Marc A. Rodwin, Hak J. Chang & Jeffrey 
Clausen, Malpractice Premiums and Physicians’ Income:  Perceptions of 
a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 25 HEALTH AFF. 759 (2006); 
William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor’s 
Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463 (2005);     
77  See Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a Laboratory for the 
Study of Law and Policy, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 499, 499 (1988) (noting that 
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all, in 2010, national health expenditures were $2.6 trillion 
dollars or 17.9% of GDP.78  Thus, health law teaching and 
scholarship is firmly connected to the real world.  Even 
theoretical scholarship in the health law field demands 
connection to facts.79 
Health law issues also invite – indeed demand – 
attention to the larger context in which legal problems 
arise, because the consequences of interpreting some laws 
in one way rather than another can be significant when 
health is at stake.80  At the same time, the process of 
applying different laws can inspire new theories and 
valuable critiques of doctrine in light of their implications 
for solving legal problems.81 Ethical issues are especially 
salient, and not just in abortion, euthanasia, and treatment 
refusal.82  For instance, laws governing medical marijuana 
should take into account how effective medical treatments 
for different diseases are.  Evaluating conflicts of interest 
among researchers requires familiarity with the way in 
                                                                                                                                      
other fields “lack the magnitude, complexity and universality of health 
care”). 
78  Anne B. Martin et al., Growth In US Health Spending 
Remained Slow In 2010; Health Share Of Gross Domestic Product Was 
Unchanged From 2009, 31 HEALTH AFF. 208, 208-9 & exhibit. 1 (2012). 
79  To be sure, as in all fields, health law scholarship includes 
theory divorced from facts, but that is a different question of the quality 
and accuracy of scholarship, not its subject matter.  See infra notes 95–
99 and accompanying text.  
80  GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE:  THE LAW OF 
AMERICAN BIOETHICS 246-249 (1993). 
81  See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, 
AND THE LAW (2009) (infusing constitutional doctrine with public health 
values); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy 
in Health Care, 97 GEO. L. J. 1 (2008); Mark A. Hall, Trust, Law, & 
Medicine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2003). 
82  Many biomedical ethics texts present issues that also raise legal 
questions.  See, e.g., ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE (Bonnie 
Steinbock, John Arras & Alex John London, eds., 7th ed. 2008); GEORGE 
J. ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS xv (2005) (reiterating that “American 
law, not philosophy or medicine, is primarily responsible for the agenda, 
development and current state of American bioethics”).  Some casebooks 
now combine both ethical and legal issues. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS, (Mark A. Hall, Maryann Bobinski & David Orentlicher, 
eds., 2007).  
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which biomedical research is conducted.  Larger questions 
of distributive justice can arise when interpreting or 
critiquing statutes that regulate financing and access to 
care.  A recent example is the controversy over health 
insurance coverage of contraceptives, now required under 
the ACA.83  The study of health law can encourage critical 
thinking about whether a particular legal approach should 
be used instead of another, in light of their respective civic 
and ethical implications.84 In short, as Annas has noted, 
studying medical problems provokes thinking about what it 
means to be human and “therefore what rights and 
obligations humans should have.”85 
Legal issues arise in clinical care, public health 
programs, biomedical research, corporate structures, 
product standards, conditions of employment, health 
insurance coverage and financing, responsibilities for 
children, and professional licensure, as well as the 
physician-patient relationship.  Health law specialists must 
identify all laws that may affect a problem.  Therefore, 
health law applies law from many legal domains: 
administrative law,86 antitrust, antidiscrimination, 
                                                          
83  FACT SHEET:  Women’s Preventive Services and Religious 
Institutions, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-
women-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions; Robert Pear, 
U.S. Clarifies Policy of Birth Control for Religious Groups, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/health/policy/ 
obama-administration-says-birth-control-mandate-applies-to-religious-
groups-that-insure-themselves.html; Catholic Business Owners Win 
Temporary Halt in Birth Control Mandate, REUTERS (July 27, 2012), 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/07_-
_July/Catholic_business_owners_win_temporary_halt_to_Obama_birth_
control_mandate/. 
84  See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and 
Health Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for 
Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQUESNE L. REV. 271 (2012); Nicole 
Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431 (2011). 
85  ANNAS, supra note 80, at 248. 
86  A remarkable number of administrative agencies deal with 
health issues, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, the 
Food and Agriculture Drug Administration, the Environmental 
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constitutional law, contracts, corporations, criminal law, 
employment law, environmental law, insurance, 
international law, patents, privacy, and torts.  So many 
different legal issues are connected to health that one might 
devote one or more semesters to them without sacrificing 
attention to important doctrinal learning, not only because 
the field is so broad, but also because doctrine taught in 
other courses can be learned within health law courses.87 
Applied fields have many opportunities to use problem-
oriented methods, which require students to identify the 
different legal tools that could be brought to bear on a real 
problem.  This approach is closer to law practice than the 
study of domains of law or legal doctrine in the abstract. 88  
Many health law professors have embraced practical 
lawyering skills somewhat more enthusiastically than most 
other specialties, offering students opportunities to work 
with law firms, hospitals, and legislatures, and to draft 
briefs amici curiae for relevant litigation.89  Northeastern 
University School of Law is a leading example of 
experiential (practice-based) legal education; its co-
operative program places law students in supervised 
                                                                                                                                      
Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
as well as state departments of health and environmental protection. 
87  ANNAS, supra note 80, at 258. 
88  See, e.g., Jonathan Todres, Beyond the Case Method:  Teaching 
Transactional Law Skills in the Classroom, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 375 
(2009). 
89  This is not to suggest that health law teaching is always 
successful.  The American Health Lawyers Association surveyed 94 
health law practitioners in 2011 on their evaluations of new health law 
graduates. Preliminary results suggest that those surveyed reported 
that the new associates were best at legal research, analytical and 
reasoning skills, and advocacy and persuasion. They were less well 
prepared in writing skills, strategic thinking, problem solving, 
administrative law and the regulatory process. Kevin Outterson, 
Associate Professor of Law at Boston University, Presentation at the 
American Health Law Association Annual Meeting (June 25, 2012) 
(copy on file with author). 
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practice settings, especially in public interest, international 
and human rights law.90 
Scholarship in health law is often relevant to policy-
makers.  Health law issues appear in the news almost daily, 
as well as in legislatures and courtrooms around the 
country.  Keeping abreast of the field necessarily requires 
paying attention to real world developments, and this 
includes problems of economics, politics, and moral 
reasoning.  One way to influence the development of the law 
is to reach policy-makers, and health law scholars often 
publish in medical and policy journals, such as Health 
Affairs and the New England Journal of Medicine, which 
policy-makers are likely to read.91  Empirical research is 
also growing in health law, perhaps because of its emphasis 
on effective solutions to real problems.92  Opportunities for 
                                                          
90  About Northeastern University Law School, NORTHEASTERN 
UNIV., http://www.northeastern.edu/law/about/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2012); STEVENS, supra note 50, at 233, 241.  
91  See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Employers and the Exchanges Under 
the Small Business Health Options Program: Examining the Potential 
and the Pitfalls, 31(2) HEALTH AFF. 267 (Feb. 2012); Mark A. Hall, 
Wenke Hwang & Allison Snow Jones, Model Safety-Net Programs Could 
Care for the Uninsured at One-Half the Cost of Medicaid or Private 
Insurance, 20 HEALTH AFF. 1698 (Sept. 2011); David A. Hyman & 
William M. Sage, Do Health Reform and Malpractice Reform Fit 
Together?, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 
Working Paper 2011-02 (2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/ 
2011/04/01/2011-04-Hyman-Sage.pdf.   
92  See Martin Partington, Empirical Legal Research and Policy-
Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
1002 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer, eds. 2010) (arguing that 
empirical legal research should be valuable to policy makers, because it 
can provide evidence to identify gaps and weaknesses in current law, 
strategies for change, and areas where legislation is not likely to solves 
problems, id at 2003-4). For examples of empirical research in health 
law, see Nicolas P. Terry, Meaningful Adoption: What We Know and 
Think We Know about the Financing, Effectiveness, Quality and Safety 
of Electronic Medical Records, J. LEGAL MEDICINE (forthcoming 2012); 
Ann Hwang, Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Creation of 
State Basic Health Programs Would Lead to 4 Percent Fewer People 
Churning Between Medicaid and Exchanges, 31(6) HEALTH AFF. 1314 
(June 2012); Bernard Black, Charles Silver, David A. Hyman & William 
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employment in health law grow almost as fast as the health 
system, and this growth should accelerate as the ACA is 
implemented.  New ideas and new courses have entered the 
curriculum most often when there was a need for new legal 
skills.  For example, in the 1800’s, Harvard Law School 
prepared its graduates to become legislators and social 
leaders by teaching the Federalist and also political 
science.93  After the New Deal created new administrative 
agencies, law schools began teaching administrative law 
and policy to prepare graduates to lead those agencies.94  
When the administrations of Presidents Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush favored more libertarian 
approaches to governing, they began to appoint lawyers 
trained in law and economics as well as Federalist Society 
members to federal administrative positions and 
judgeships.95  Today, there should be expanded 
opportunities for employment for lawyers who know the 
health care system, as well as those in environmental law.  
These opportunities exist not only in private law practice, 
but also in government agencies, legislatures, and 
commercial and nonprofit health-related organizations.  
Health law training can prepare lawyers for all these 
options, because it includes systematic knowledge of health 
systems. 
Of course, the health law field is not without its own 
problems.  The most daunting is its scope.96  It is difficult to 
master all the relevant legal domains and avoid 
                                                                                                                                      
Sage, Stability, Not Crisis:  Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in 
Texas, 1988–2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005).   
93  R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal 
Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, in 
THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 154-175 (David Thelen ed., 
1988). 
94  CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS 
AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 197 (1998). 
95  STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT:  THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 141, 158 (2008). 
96  Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an Architecture of Health Law, 35 
AM. J. L. & MED. 67, 68 (2009). 
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dilettantism.97  As a result, the quality of health law 
scholarship remains uneven.  Some of the health law field’s 
advantages may undermine rigor in scholarship.  For 
example, empirical and other research that is funded by 
external donors may be influenced, perhaps unwittingly, by 
the money itself or the donor’s goals, in the same ways that 
conflicts of interest can affect biomedical research.98  If 
funding is available for drafting new laws limiting liability, 
for example, but not for laws reducing the risk of harm, 
then more recommendations for liability limits are likely to 
be produced. 
Health law often considers valuable insights from other 
disciplines, which should expand and enhance our view of 
the law and its effects.  At times, however, viewing a legal 
issue only from a single disciplinary perspective can distort 
the analysis.  Learning a little bit about economics, 
sociology or epidemiology, for example, can be a dangerous 
thing, if one begins to view all law from the perspective of 
that discipline alone.99  In some cases, the new disciplinary 
perspective overtakes the law, reversing their roles.  If that 
happens, the law can be seen simply as a tool to achieve the 
                                                          
97  In this respect, health law resembles emergency medicine, 
which requires knowledge of many medical specialties.  The medical 
profession did not recognize emergency medicine as a distinct specialty 
for many years, partly because of its applied nature. See generally 
BRIAN J. ZINK, ANYONE, ANYTHING, ANYTIME—A HISTORY OF 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE (2005). 
98  The potential for conflicts of interest to create bias in biomedical 
research is well known.  See, e.g., BERNARD LO, CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 195 
(2009); Lee Friedman & Elihu Richter, Relationship Between Conflicts 
of Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2004); 
David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 284 JAMA 
2234 (2000); Dennis Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of 
Interest, 329 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 573 (1993). 
99  Stevens call this a “monocausal vision of the legal system.” 
STEVENS, supra note 50, at 272. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, 
Categorically Biased:  The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law 
and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1133-39 (2003) (discussing 
how various personal and experiential schemas bias how we process 
information).  
30 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:1 
 
goals of the other discipline, rather than a field with its own 
values and goals.100 
A different kind of bias may arise from one’s philosophy 
of law or personal ideology.101 Although this is hardly 
unique to health law, health law scholarship may have more 
opportunities to fall prey to such bias, because it examines 
so many controversial social issues on which most people 
have strong opinions.  It can be difficult to maintain a truly 
neutral perspective when analyzing laws or doctrines that 
affect the outcome of an issue important to the scholar.102  
This is especially risky in applied fields like health law, 
where scholars may have a somewhat shallow 
understanding of the doctrine that applies to a hot-button 
issue and neglect to adequately analyze precedent and 
arguments that contradict a preferred interpretation.103  It 
                                                          
100  See David M. Trubek, The Place of Law and Social Science in 
the Structure of Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 483 (1985).  For 
example, the concepts of law and economics added a valuable 
perspective to legal analysis, but some adherents began to argue that 
law itself should conform to classical microeconomic theory.  TELES, 
supra note 95, at 90-134. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE 
RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 130-48 
(2008) (describing the Federalist Society and the development of a 
conservative movement to change constitutional law).  Another example 
can be found in public health law, where some scholars see the law as 
simply a tool to achieve health, regardless of other goals, such as justice 
and liberty. For a critique of this approach, see Wendy K. Mariner, Law 
and Public Health:  Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 
247, 279-284 (2005).  
101  See Norman G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in 
Research, 347 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 759 (2002). 
102  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) 
(describing theories and empirical research in psychology demonstrating 
how people often fail to analyze complex questions or accept evidence 
that contradicts their experience, biases or preferences). 
103  Compare, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, 
Handguns, Health, and the Second Amendment, 360 NEW ENGL. J. 
MED. 2360, 2361-63 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court had not 
specifically decided whether the Second Amendment protected an 
individual or collective right to bear arms before District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)), with Lawrence O. Gostin, The 
Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, 300 JAMA 1575 (2008) (noting that 
earlier cases were understood to limit the Second Amendment’s 
protection to a collective right to maintain a militia). 
2013 DID LEGAL EDUCATION FAIL HEALTH REFORM? 31 
 
 
 
can be easy to convince ourselves that our preferred 
understanding of doctrine or precedent is the indisputably 
correct interpretation, especially where precedent is limited 
and open to interpretation.104  Some constitutional law 
scholars seem to have succumbed to this error in arguing 
about the scope of the Commerce Clause during the ACA 
litigation.105 
Strong convictions about the correct interpretation of 
law can lead to advocacy.  Of course, practicing lawyers 
properly advocate for their clients, and make clear that they 
are doing so. Scholarship is a different matter.  It should 
offer honest, balanced analysis that recognizes different 
approaches and opinions.  Scholarship does not preclude 
arguing for a particular interpretation or approach, but 
arguments are not statements of fact.  There should be no 
hidden agendas in scholarship.  When scholarship presents 
a preferred interpretation as fact or doctrine, it is poor 
scholarship.106  It may also cross the line into advocacy.  If it 
                                                          
104  See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney 
General of the United States for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70964/00355_020801_001displ
ay.pdf; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General of 
the United States for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://dspace.wrlc. 
org/doc/bitstream/2041/70967/00355_020801_004display.pdf; 
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice for William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel 
of the [U.S.] Department of Defense (Mar. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf.  See also 
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007) (noting that these 
memorandums were later withdrawn). 
105   Brian Leiter, Why did most legal scholars, liberal and 
conservative, fail to realize that the Supreme Court might take the silly 
arguments against the “individual mandate” seriously?, Brian Leiter’s 
Law School Reports, available at http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ 
leiter/2012/04/why-did-most-legal-scholars-liberal-and-conservative-fail-
to-realize-that-the-supreme-court-might-ta.html. 
106  See for example Matthew L. Myers, Protecting Public Health by 
Strengthening the Food and Drug Administration’s Authority over 
Tobacco Products, 343 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1806, 1808 (2000), for a 
discussion of how health lawyers believed, before the Food Drug and 
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fails to disclose its advocacy goal, it can be seen as 
deceptive. 
Scholars in the health law field have many tempting 
opportunities to write as advocates, because the health care 
system has so many issues of public importance on which 
people hold strong views.  When scholars write articles, as 
opposed to advocacy or opinion pieces, on such topics, it is 
essential to remain open-minded and use one’s critical 
analysis skills to recognize facts and arguments that 
challenge one’s preferred outcome. This is especially 
important in health law, where decision makers may rely on 
health law scholarship to develop policy far more than they 
may rely on more esoteric scholarship on legal theory. 
V. A BROADER VISION FOR HEALTH LAW 
 
The Carnegie Report’s first recommendation for 
improving legal education was to develop an integrated 
curriculum with 3 goals: 
 
(1) the teaching of legal doctrine and analysis, 
which provides the basis for professional 
growth; (2) introduction to the several facets of 
practice included under the rubric of 
lawyering, leading to acting with responsibility 
for clients; and (3) exploration and assumption 
of the identity, values and dispositions 
consonant with the fundamental purposes of 
the legal profession.  Integrating the three 
parts of legal education would better prepare 
students for the varied demands of professional 
legal work.107 
                                                                                                                                      
Cosmetic Act was amended to authorize the FDA to regulate tobacco, 
that the FDA already had statutory authority to regulate the tobacco 
industry and were surprised when the Supreme Court found that the 
FDA’s authority – to approve only safe and effective new drugs – could 
not include tobacco in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120 (2000). 
107  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, 
LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION 
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One need not accept the Report’s specific critiques or 
conclusions to recognize that health law offers a good model 
for a law school curriculum that integrates knowledge, 
analysis, theory, attention to context, practical application, 
values, and meaningful change. 
A common theme underlying many proposals to reform 
legal education is that of increasing attention to the role of 
lawyers in society:  to inculcate in students an 
understanding of the obligation of lawyers to the rule of law 
and the importance of justice overall.  Too often the lawyer’s 
role is understood narrowly, focusing only on the ethics of 
the private practice of law.108  If law is a profession, it must 
stand for something, and that something should be 
justice.109  Moreover, justice is for everyone, not only a 
client.  So, a deeper understanding of the role of lawyers 
and the rule of law requires expanding our intellectual 
horizons to encompass the role of law in society.   
This begs the question of what law is; a question well 
beyond the scope of this essay.  Nevertheless, it is worth 
asking whether we can honestly say that law is a science 
with formal rules and neutral, objective principles of justice.  
I think not – as long as there are differing theories of justice 
and no universally accepted standard for choosing among 
them.110  The periodic waves of jurisprudential scholarship 
                                                                                                                                      
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW, SUMMARY 8 (The Carnegie Found. for 
the Advancement of Teaching ed. 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE 
SUMMARY].  The Carnegie Report recognized the difficulty of 
implementing its recommendations.  Remaking a curriculum is a 
complicated undertaking that may require years of work.  Human 
beings are naturally reluctant to change what they are doing.  See also 
Carsik, supra note 37, at 814 (noting that in academia, curriculum 
changes can be perceived as a threat to the value of the faculty’s work, 
while there may also be personal rewards for working with other 
faculty, learning their perspectives, and discovering new insights). 
108  See Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question:  What 
Is the Purpose of Law School?, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48 (2003). 
109  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 131; M MCCRATE REPORT, 
supra note 37, at 140-41 (“striving to promote justice, fairness, and 
morality” is one of the four fundamental values of the legal profession). 
110  The vast literature on theories of justice is testimony to the 
multitude of different perspectives.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
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from different perspectives are evidence of an unsettled 
system. 
So, what can we teach?  If law constructs rules based on 
justice and fairness, we can, and often do, turn to political 
economy, economics, social theory, and moral philosophy to 
try to determine what is fair.  Each of these fields offers 
important insights and perspectives to enrich our thinking.  
But, each also has its own ambiguities and internal 
conflicts, so that the same lack of consensus can reemerge in 
different jargon:  no ultimate neutral standard of justice.  
Law professors, not fully expert in those fields, can be 
understandably nervous about relying on any single 
approach for ultimate insights. 
For me, the only realistic answer is to live with the 
messiness of law. It means giving up the idea that there 
necessarily is a right answer, while continuing the search.  
We need to keep asking why we should accept a legal 
principle.  What purpose does it serve, not only in principle, 
but in people’s daily lives?  It means analyzing doctrine in 
the context of the world in which law applies and its 
consequences for real people.  It means recognizing the need 
for change, interacting with people who are affected by the 
law (and the absence of law), and, most importantly, 
explicitly considering the social, financial, and moral 
implications of law – not merely in theory, but as 
experienced by all those affected.111   
In his President’s Report to the Board of Overseers of 
Harvard University for 1981-82, Derek Bok aptly compared 
the legal system to the health care system, finding both to 
be increasingly sophisticated, but also complex, costly and 
                                                                                                                                      
JUSTICE (2009); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY 
OF THE STATE (1989); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980); EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE:  THE PHILOSOPHY AND 
METHOD OF THE LAW (rev. ed. 1974); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, 
AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
111  See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN 
SOCIETY (1976); Harold Lasswell & Myres Mcdougal, Legal Education 
and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 53 YALE 
L. J. 203 (1943). 
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maldistributed across the population.112 His conclusion 
remains true today:  “The blunt, inexcusable fact is that this 
nation, which prides itself on efficiency and justice, has 
developed a legal system that is the most expensive in the 
world, yet cannot manage to protect the rights of its 
citizens.”113  Although there may be no more court cases per 
capita than in the past, there are more statutes and 
regulations to negotiate, just as there are more medical 
tests and therapies for disease.  Like medical students, law 
students often choose lucrative private practice specialties 
rather than public service, partly to repay the increasing 
cost of their educations.  Specialties in both medicine and 
law are more rewarding, both in money and prestige, than 
primary care and general practice.  The growth of large 
multistate and multinational law firms mirrored the 
consolidation of both hospital systems and insurance 
companies, resulting in higher compensation for partners 
and associates and higher fees for clients,114 although the 
recession has dampened that trend.115  Major law firms 
concentrate on providing services at rates that only large 
organizations and wealthy individuals can pay.  Low and 
middle-income families and small businesses cannot afford 
much justice.  Legal service organizations and public 
defenders are generally underpaid while reaching only a 
fraction of those who need their help.  In this respect, the 
health care system performs somewhat better, because 
public and private health insurance, as well as 
uncompensated care pools, are available. 
                                                          
112  Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 
HARVARD MAGAZINE 38, 38, 40 (May-June 1983), reprinted in 33 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 570, 570, 572 (1983). 
113  Id. at 41. 
114  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in 
the Law:  Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization 
of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621, 628, 631 (1994). 
115  America’s Law Schools and Firms:  Trouble with the Law, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2010, at 79, available at http://www. 
economist.com/node/17461573. 
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Bok’s report sparked many commentaries, but few 
concrete changes.116   Here, health law may offer some 
valuable perspectives.  Because health lawyers often deal 
with issues of equitable access to health care, they should be 
particularly attuned to the ways in which laws promote or 
hinder access to justice.  Thus, they may be alert to 
problems of justice and fairness in the legal system.117 
The Affordable Care Act lays out a program for near 
universal access to health care.  Although the ACA does not 
directly control the health care costs that created pressure 
for reform, it puts the cost of care on the agenda for future 
experiments and reforms.118  Perhaps it is time to initiate 
reform not only in legal education, but, as Bok urged, in the 
legal system as a whole.  Real reform would go beyond 
ongoing efforts to improve law school curricula.  Reform 
goals should include enabling access to essential legal 
services for the entire population.  For example, adapting 
the model of medical residencies for graduates of medical 
schools, creating a one or two year residency program in 
which law graduates spend time working for low and 
middle-income clients under the supervision of licensed 
attorneys would give graduates important practical 
experience and expand the services available to those in 
need.119  To integrate such training and experience into the 
                                                          
116  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional 
Reform, 45 MD. L. REV. 274 (1986); Roger Cramton, The Trouble with 
Lawyers (and Law Schools), 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359 (1985); David M. 
Trubek, Comments on the Bok Report - A Strategy for Legal Studies:  
Getting Bok to Work, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 586 (1983); Alfred F. Conrad, 
The Law School’s Responsibility for the Quantity of Justice, 33 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 600 (1983); Stephen Gillers, Great Expectations:  Conceptions of 
Lawyers at the Angle of Entry, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 662 (1983). 
117  See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976). 
118  See An Act Improving The Quality Of Health Care and 
Reducing Costs Through Increased Transparency, Efficiency And 
Innovation, 2012 Mass. Acts, in which Massachusetts enacted payment 
reform legislation intended to slow the growth of health care costs, only 
a few years after enacting health care reform. 
119  For early recommendations for similar clinical years, see 
CARNEGIE, REPORT, supra note 37, at 192; STEVENS, supra note 50, at 242-3. 
An alternative might be to borrow an approach from European legal 
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curriculum before graduation, the third year of law school 
could be transformed into an analog of medical school 
clerkships.  Third year students could work in government 
agencies, non-profit, and legal service organizations. There 
should be plenty of opportunities for such placements in the 
health care system, but similar opportunities could surely 
be found in education, housing, family law, energy and 
environmental placements.  In this way, legal education 
might begin to respond more effectively to both the Ivory 
Tower and Social Justice critiques and improve access to 
justice for everyone.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Arguments over the constitutionality of the ACA – in the 
courts, in public debates, in scholarly articles, and blogs – 
illustrate the pervasiveness of health law issues in society.  
It also demonstrates that many participants in that debate, 
both those for and against the ACA, remained wedded to 
theories that have become disconnected from twenty first 
century realities.  Legal education may have something to 
answer for in this respect.  The more law moves away from 
strict principles into nuanced adjustments to new 
circumstances, the more lawyers will need to understand 
the circumstances.  As the search for more affordable, 
responsive, and responsible legal education continues, it is 
worth emulating the best features of health law.  Health 
law scholars should be proactive in translating their 
successes into broader curriculum changes, especially 
attention to context, both in theory and practice.  Because 
the context includes how law affects society at large, 
meaningful reform should adopt as its ultimate goal 
extending affordable access to justice for all. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
education, which requires law graduates who pass a partial licensure 
examination to practice for two or three years (much like a medical 
residency) and then take another examination to qualify for full 
licensure. 
